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Injustice is a prominent theme in the news but there is
far less attention to how to be effective in opposing it.
For activists, it is crucial to understand how reactions
against injustice can be ignited and/or inhibited.
Injustice towards refugees provides a revealing case
study.
If an injustice is widely publicised to a supportive
audience, sometimes it may backfire on those who are
perceived as the perpetrators. For example, in 1991
Indonesian troops shot hundreds of mourners at Santa
Cruz cemetery in Dili, East Timor. The massacre was
witnessed by western journalists and captured on
video by filmmaker Max Stahl; the news and graphic
video galvanised the East Timor liberation support
movement internationally. The massacre, instead of
repressing the independence movement, backfired on
the Indonesian occupiers by generating greater
resistance (Kohen, 1999; McMillan, 1992).
But most injustices do not backfire. There had been
many previous massacres in East Timor that did not
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create anything like the outrage from the Dili
massacres. Perpetrators have five main techniques for
inhibiting backfire: covering up the action, devaluing
the target, reinterpreting the events, using official
channels such as formal investigations to give the
appearance of justice, and using intimidation and
bribery to deter opposition. These factors can be found
in numerous attacks, both those that backfired and
those that didn't. The Dili massacre illustrates this.
Cover-up: After the massacre, Indonesian forces cut
off communication to the outside world. They alerted
Australian customs officials in an attempt to confiscate
Stahl's videotapes, but he wisely gave them to someone
else to smuggle out of the country.
Devaluation of the target: Indonesian officials
made disparaging comments about the protesters. The
occupiers, dominated by Javanese, looked down on
East Timorese as inferior.
Reinterpretation of the action: Indonesian
officials claimed that protesters had triggered the
shooting. They also minimised the number of
casualties.
Official channels: The Indonesian government set
up an inquiry into the incident; it whitewashed the
massacre, giving token sentences to a few individuals.
The Indonesian military also set up an inquiry; it
followed a similar pattern.
Intimidation and bribery: After the massacre,
Indonesian troops arrested, beat and killed many
figures in the independence movement. On the other
hand, those who cooperated with the occupiers could
expect to receive incentives or maintain jobs.
In summary, the Indonesian military used all five
techniques for inhibiting backfire from the Dili
massacre. These techniques, especially cover-up, had
worked to minimise outrage from previous massacres
but, in the case of the Dili massacre, the techniques
were inadequate to the task. The events were broadcast
to the world, thus breaking through efforts at cover-up.
Attempts to devalue the victims and to reinterpret the
events had little salience with worldwide audiences,
and similarly the official investigations had little
credibility. Intimidation and bribery no doubt affected
East Timorese participation in the resistance, but did
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not affect international audiences, many of whom
decided to join the East Timor support movement.
The concept of backfire grows out of the study of
nonviolent action: it is often observed that violent
assaults on nonviolent protesters can create sympathy
and support from members of the grievance group,
from third parties, and even among the attacker group
(Sharp, 1973). The same process can also occur for
other sorts of injustices, well outside violencenonviolence scenarios, such as censorship (Jansen and
Martin 2003) and torture (Martin and Wright 2003).
A good example is the invasion and occupation of Iraq,
which stimulated worldwide protests and antagonised
world opinion (Martin 2004).
Cover-up: There had been many military attacks on
Iraq from 1991 until 2003, but most of these fell
beneath the threshold for media interest. The US
government kept quiet about its support for Saddam
Hussein in the 1980s. On the other hand, the 2003
attack on Iraq was announced well in advance,
enabling worldwide mobilisation of protest.
Devaluation of the target: Saddam Hussein was
portrayed as the epitome of evil and likened to Hitler.
This was the most effective part of the US
government's efforts to build support for its attack.
Reinterpretation of the action: The US and allied
governments claimed that the invasion was because of
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and links to al
Qaeda. These claims were weak before the invasion
and became less credible afterwards. The assertion
that the aim was to liberate Iraq was vulnerable to the
charge of double standards, because of the many
dictatorships that were not invaded. The US
government has largely lost the ongoing struggle over
interpretation of the operation.
Official channels: The US government attempted
but was unable to win UN support for the invasion.
Many legal experts said the war was illegal. Lack of
independent legitimation for the attack helped
increase opposition.
Intimidation and bribery: Behind the scenes, the
US government used threats and bribes to win the
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backing of UN Security Council members for a
resolution backing war, but these efforts were
unsuccessful. Troops in Iraq have been threatened
with penalties for speaking out, and likewise
journalists were induced to become tame by being
embedded or else, if they were independent, subject to
threats. But these efforts were insufficient to stop
damaging information getting out of Iraq.
In summary, the US government used all five methods
for inhibiting backfire, but was successful with only
one, devaluation of Saddam Hussein. Therefore it is
not surprising that the Iraq invasion has turned out to
be a political disaster for the invaders, with
international opinion polls showing greatly reduced
support for the US in most countries surveyed.
Note that backfire is an ongoing process. Every media
release and government inquiry is a facet of an
ongoing struggle over the meaning and consequences
of the event. The struggle over injustice can last for
decades. For example, the Turkish government
continues to deny its role in the genocide of the
Armenians in 1915.

The Treatment of Refugees in
Australia
To many people, the treatment of asylum seekers and
refugees in Australia is an obvious injustice warranting
action. But there are many others who support,
tolerate or don't care about government policy on
refugees. To better understand how concern about
treatment of refugees is contained, we examine each of
the five methods to inhibit backfire. At the same time,
we look at methods of amplifying backfire by
countering or sidestepping each of the five methods of
inhibition. The point of this analysis is to understand
better the tactics of the government and its supporters
and to offer insight for developing counter-tactics that
can ignite concern about injustice to refugees.

Cover-up
Most asylum seekers who arrive in Australia by boat
are imprisoned in the detention camps in remote parts
of the country, where it is difficult for advocates,
journalists and lawyers to visit. The government denies
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journalists access to the camps, thus limiting public
awareness of the treatment of detainees. Even Mary
Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, had difficulty gaining access to the
camps.
The government strategy of imposing communications
blackouts on asylum seekers has meant the public
seldom knows their names or the horror of their
personal stories. We would not know how physically
sick and mentally traumatised the asylum seekers were
while making their journey to seek a safe haven.

Devaluation of the Target
Asylum seekers are frequently labelled illegals or
queue-jumpers. Putting them in detention camps
suggests that they are criminals, even though 90% are
found to be genuine refugees.
Asylum seekers are frequently denounced as not being
genuine refugees, citing their passage through transit
countries as proof. However, the government failed to
add that the transit countries such as Malaysia,
Indonesia and Pakistan were not signatories to the
1951 Refugee Convention. (Brennan, 2003). Further,
the public was never informed that many asylum
seekers had never had official papers or the means to
obtain them. Despite this, and knowing that the UN
Refugee Convention, to which Australia is a signatory,
says that "everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy
in other countries asylum from persecution," official
government language persisted in describing asylum
seekers as "illegals" and "unauthorised arrivals,"
thereby casting them as unlawful or criminal.
In August 2001, the Norwegian ship Tampa took on
board 438 Afghani asylum seekers. These asylum
seekers were recast by the Australian government,
albeit for a short period, as potential hijackers of the
ship and dangerous and threatening to the Tampa's
captain and crew (Marr and Wilkinson, 2003).
To discourage sympathy for the asylum seekers on
SIEV 4 (Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel 4), which
arrived in October 2001, the government directed its
photographers that no "humanising" photos of the
asylum seekers were to be taken or circulated publicly
(Skehan, 2002).
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Reinterpretation of the Action
Supporters of refugee rights emphasise the right of
asylum seekers to humane treatment according to
international conventions. The government, on the
other hand, presents itself as following the law. In its
own terms this is correct, in that Australian legislation
has been passed that mandates treatment of asylum
seekers using detention camps, temporary protection
visas and the like. The government then can present
itself as following the law and using proper procedures.
In addition, the government talks about protecting
Australians from an invasion of dangerous foreigners.
In October 2001, an overcrowded and unseaworthy
boat with 223 sick and exhausted asylum seekers was
sinking. Photos showed children in the water, whom
the government said had been thrown overboard by
immoral parents seeking to blackmail the government
into providing asylum. Known as the "children
overboard" affair, the government's interpretation of
what was happening legitimated its treatment of the
asylum seekers. A Senate inquiry into the
government's role in the "children overboard" affair
found "through a combination of denial, obfuscation
and misleading statements, the media, senior officials
and the public were deliberately and systematically
deceived" (Forbes and Gordon, 2002).
The government revised its own borders, excising
Ashmore Reef and Christmas Island from Australia for
the purposes of migration, thereby redefining what are
legitimate arrival locations for asylum seekers. It also
emphasised protection of Australia's borders from
unwanted arrivals.

Official Channels
Official channels reduce outrage about injustice when
they give assurance that justice is being provided.
Asylum seekers have been offered a variety of formal
procedures to obtain justice. These include formal
application for refugee status, processes for obtaining
visas, and appeals against rejected applications. These
processes give the appearance of due process and fair
treatment, but in practice are stacked against
applicants. For example, the so-called "queue" - formal
avenues for applying for refugee status - does not exist
in many countries, where there are no places to make
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applications. Furthermore, many asylum seekers have
no suitable documents. From within an Australian
detention centre, the process for obtaining various
sorts of visas is slow, bureaucratic and includes
punitive restrictions on visa-holders. Thus, in most
cases the available official channels give only the
appearance of justice with little substance.
The Tampa saga led supporters of refugees to mount
many legal challenges to government treatment of
asylum seekers, but without obvious major victories.
When these challenges were publicised, this
sometimes raised awareness about the treatment of
asylum seekers.

Intimidation and Bribery
The Australian government's border protection
policies, including the Pacific Solution, served as a
punitive strategy to deter asylum seekers from the
mainland. It sought to hide the treatment of asylum
seekers and refugees from the media, refugee
advocates and lawyers. Deals done with poor
neighbouring countries such as Papua New Guinea and
Nauru resulted in the Australian government
budgeting $240 million in 2002-2003 (Brennan,
2003).
The Australian government's least publicised border
protection strategy, known as Operation Relex, was
implemented to prevent asylum seekers reaching
Australian shores. The Australian Federal Police
participated with the Indonesian national police in a
"disruption program" that employed strike teams to
"disrupt and dismantle" people smuggling operations.
The sabotage of asylum seeker boats, with the
intention of sinking them close offshore, is recorded as
an official strategy employed by participants of
Operation Relex (Marr and Wilkinson, 2003).
In view of the existence of this "disruption program,"
questions have been asked, but not satisfactorily
answered, on the sinking of SIEV X, where only 46 of
the 399 asylum seekers survived.
In the Tampa story, the inference of "dangerous" boat
people was unsustainable and the emphasis shifted to
the rescuer when the Australian government
threatened the captain of the Tampa with the charge of
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people smuggling should he fail to take the sick and
terrified asylum seekers to an Indonesian port (Marr
and Wilkinson, 2003).
In summary, in detention camps and during the
Tampa standoff, the children overboard affair and
various border protection operations, the Australian
government employed at different times all five
techniques for inhibiting backfire. Efforts to cover up
official strategies to repel, make invisible or punish
asylum seekers were crucial in assisting the
government to win the November 2001 election.
However, these tactics eventually provoked outrage,
inspired whistleblowers and motivated investigations
for truthful information from official and unofficial
quarters. The government had more success with
dehumanising the asylum seekers. Countering this
were creative efforts to tell the real stories of asylum
seekers in mainstream film, theatre, song and storytelling. Many varied attempts at reinterpreting the
situation around asylum seekers exposed the
underlying agenda of political opportunism and
xenophobia. Legal challenges to the government's
immigration and detention policies sometimes served
to highlight the issues but possibly were less successful
in bringing about systemic reform and justice.
Intimidation operated on many levels and significantly
reduced the voices of asylum seekers themselves who
were at the mercy of the government. Eventually,
countries participating in the Pacific Solution spoke
out about the flaws in this scheme and the political
expediency that motivated it.

Conclusion
Backfire analysis serves as an important tool for
activists by providing a framework based on
examination of significant attacks on vulnerable
groups. Most importantly, the framework suggests
practical responses to injustice: for example, to
counter cover-up, expose the injustice; to counter
devaluation, humanise the targets; to counter
reinterpretation, emphasise intuitive understandings
of injustice; to counter the bog of official channels,
focus on campaigning; to counter intimidation, persist
in the face of attacks.
Backfire analysis offers insights that can help activists
to develop strategies, such as exposing unjust actions,
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mobilising public concern and expose intimidation, to
counter unjust political decision-making and
undemocratic attacks against citizens. Promoting
backfire can see activists publicly correcting official
misinformation, laying blame at the door of attackers,
correcting the official interpretations of events through
their films and statements, gathering truthful
information and disseminating it in a variety of
creative and grassroots methods.
Oppressors can use the backfire framework too, to
obtain guidance on limiting protest. But most
oppressors believe they are in the right, not that they
are engaged in injustice. Therefore, it is far more
advantageous for everyone to know about how to
promote outrage from injustice.
When the shock of unjust attacks by governments and
institutions is combined with the impact of the many
methods they employ to inhibit backfire, even the
experienced activist can feel overwhelmed and
immobilised. The backfire framework provides a useful
guide for developing proactive initiatives to create
backfire against the perpetrators.
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